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MARTIN R. GARDNER*
The death penalty, as it is imposed . . . is a disgusting butchery,
an outrage inflicted on the spirit and body of man. .... Today,
when this ignoble death is secretly administered, what meaning
can such torture have? The truth is that in an atomic age we kill as
we did in the age of steelyards . . . science, which has taupht us
too much about killing, could at least teach us to kill decently.
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court has recently held for the first
time that capital punishment as a legislative response to crime is not
necessarily cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution.2 The action of the Court set-
tled, at least for the time being, some of the legal controversy sur-
rounding the death penalty, and after a moratorium of almost ten
years, the ultimate legal sanction was again administered in the
United States.3
These developments in no way signal an end to the controversy
surrounding the execution of criminals. The Supreme Court's ruling
that capital punishment is not unconstitutional per se raises new is-
sues concerning the administration of the death penalty. One such
issue, understandably neglected during the debate over the constitu-
tionality of capital punishment itself, is the constitutionality of the
various means used to take the lives of the condemned. Legislative
attempts to provide more humane alternatives to the present modes-
hanging, shooting, electrocuting, and gassing-have already begun.4 In
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1. Camus, Reflections on the Guillotine, in TlE PENALTY is DEATI 131, 151 (B. Jones
ed, 1968).
2. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). Dicta in past cases had suggested that the death
penalty was not unconstitutional. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958). Two Justices,
Brennan and Marshall, have expressed the view that capital punishment is indeed violative of the
eighth amendment. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (Brenlan and Marshall, JJ., con-
curring separately).
3. Gary Mark Gilmore was executed on January 17, 1977, by a Utah firing squad. The last
person executed in the United States before Gilmore was Luis Jose Monge in June, 1967. H.
BEDAU, THE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 121 (1977).
4. The states of Oklahoma and Texas have recently become the first states to provide
lethal injection as the method of capital punishment. See 1977 Okla. Svss. Law Serv., ch, 41, § 1014;
1977 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 138 § 1. Until the introduction of lethal injection, capital punish-
ment was administered through hanging, firing squad, electrocution, and lethal gas. See W.
BOWERS, EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA 9-12 (1974).
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addition, a wave of cases examining the legality of the traditional
modes of execution cannot be far away.'
The elimination of barbarity from the process of administering
death is a concern not only of those advocating abolition of capital
punishment 6 but of many who favor its retention.7 Apart from shared
humanitarian concerns, however, abolitionists may also utilize these
methodological challenges to buy time for another direct assault on
the institution of capital punishment itself.8 Moreover, attacks on the
modes of capital punishment may well aid the abolitionist cause
through media coverage that informs an otherwise uninformed public
of the ritualistic horrors of executions.9
This article assesses the present administration of the death pen-
alty in light of the requirements of the cruel and unusual punishment
clause of the eighth amendment. The Supreme Court has never di-
rectly confronied the issue of the cruelty associated with the various
methods of imposing capital punishment.10 Thus, the pronounce-
ments of the Court that have sanctioned a particular means of caus-
ing death can be characterized either as dicta or as highly suspect
law, given subsequent doctrinal development of the cruel and unusual
punishment clause and advances in medical science. It would appear
that the courts are now free to strike down as unconstitutionally
cruel some, if not all, of the traditional methods of inflicting death.
5. Reforms in penal law generally, and in capital punishment in particular, are often
achieved more quickly through the courts than through the legislative process. See Bedau, The
Courts, the Constitution, and Capital Punishment, 1968 UTAH L. REv. 201, 239.
6. "If the French state is incapable of overcoming its worst impulses .. . and of furnish-
ing Europe with one of the remedies it needs most [abolition of capital punishment], let it at least
reform its means of administering capital punishment." Camus, supra note 1, at 151.
7. No less a defender of capital punishment than Immanuel Kant said, "Mhe death of the
criminal must be kept entirely free of any maltreatment that would make an abomination of the
humanity residing in the person suffering it." Kant, The Right to Punish, in P,'Nzs11.%t'r AND
REHABILITATION 35, 37 (J. Murphy ed. 1973). In the words of another retentionist, "I readily
concede at the outset that present ways of dealing out capital punishment are . . . revolting. ...
Like many of our prisons, our modes of execution should change." Barzun, In Favor of Capital
Punishment, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 154, 155 (H. Bedau ed. 1968). The author
suggests that we seek methods of "painless, sudden, and dignified death." Id.
8. See 8 TEXAS TECH. L. REv. 515, 523 (1976).
9. Id. Executions are conducted away from direct public slight. The public is unaware of
the details of an execution. See M. MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL THE SUPREME COURT AND
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 60-64 (1973). "It has often been n9ted that American citizens know
almost nothing about capital punishment." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 362 (1972) (Mar-
shall, J., concurring). "Public knowledge of the realities of execution today is remote, for the
people are protected by prison walls and a semantic veil. The symbols but not the substance reach
them." Gottlieb, Capital Punishment, 15 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 1, 6 (1969). For evidence
that information about the grisly details of death by hanging, the electric chair, and the gas cham-
ber can play a part in shaking the public support for capital punishment, see Sarat & Vidmar,
Public Opinion, the Death Penalty, and the Eighth Amendment: Testing the Marshall Hypo-
thesis, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 171, 195, 205-06.
10. Cruelty may be defined as "the infliction of pain . . . without necessity. . .
Gottlieb, supra note 9, at 11. The Court apparently has never considered evidence on the actual
pain caused by any method of execution. Note, The Death Penalty Cases, 56 CALIF. L REV.
1268, 1334 (1968). See text accompanying notes 20-22, 28-48 infra.
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The discussion first examines relevant opinions of the United
States Supreme Court to discover and articulate the proper analytical
standards for assessing modes of execution. On the basis of these
standards the author proposes a paradigm of capital punishment that
avoids the cruelty of present practices, and argues that the paradigm
is constitutionally acceptable under, perhaps even mandated by, the
cruel and unusual punishment clause. Finally, contemporary modes
of execution are assessed in light of the legal standards and the con-
stitutional paradigm.
Nothing in this paper is intended to justify capital punishment.
The ultimate merits of capital punishment should continue to be de-
bated even if more humane methods are substituted for present bar-
barities. This article focuses solely upon whether various methods of
execution are constitutional if capital punishment is to be employed.
II. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AS A MEASURE OF METHODS
OF EXECUTION
The suggestion that methods of execution be scrutinized in terms
of the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment
is not novel." Indeed, it is widely agreed that the clause was initially
intended to apply to the cruelty of particular kinds of punishment, 2
including modes of administering the death penalty.'t That eighth
amendment analysis has recently been used to find cruelty when
punishment was excessive in degree 4 in no way indicates that the
courts are moving away from the traditional application of the amend-
ment to specific kinds of cruel treatment.' 5 Whether their inquiry is
11. The eighth amendment provides, in full: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CoNST. amend. Vill.
12. "Expressions in the first congress confirm the view that the cruel and unusual punish-
ments clause was directed at prohibiting certain methods of punishment." Granucci, "Nor
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. RLv. 839, 842
(1969). "Following adoption, state and federal jurists accepted the view that the clause prohibited
certain methods of punishment." Id. See also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 377 (1972)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting); L. BERKSON, THE CONCEPT OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISIIstLNT 3-5
(1975).
13. The early copgressional debates concerning the cruel and unusual punishment clause
reflect an awareness that particular methods of inflicting capital punishment might be proscribed
by the clause:
Mr. Livermore [of New Hampshire]-the clause seems to express a great deal of humanity,
on which account I have no objection to it; but it seems to have no meaning in it, I do not
think it necessary. . . No cruel and unusual punishment is to be inflicted; it is son-
times necessary to hang a man, villains often deserve whipping, and perhaps having their
ears cut off; but are we in future to be prevented from inflicting these punishments
because they are cruel?
I ANNALS OF CONG. 782-83 (1789) (emphasis added).
14. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
15. In 1958, for example, the Supreme Court found the punishment of loss of citizenship
to be unconstitutionally cruel and unusual. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). More recently,
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found whipping of prisoners to be a form of cruel and unusual
punishment. Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).
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directed to cruelty in kind or in degree of punishment, however, the
courts find it difficult to interpret and apply the value-laden concepts
underlying the cruel and unusual punishment clause.
16
A. The Supreme Court and Methods of Execution
Although capital punishment has existed in America since colon-
ial times,' 7 the first serious Supreme Court challenge to a method of
inflicting the death penalty did not occur until 1878. In the case of
Wilkerson v. Utah's the defendant had been convicted of first degree
murder in the Territory of Utah and sentenced to be "publicly shot
until . . . dead."' 9 The territorial statutes provided the death pen-
alty for first degree murder but did not specify the method of execu-
tion. Prior statutes had specified shooting, hanging, and beheading
as the methods of capital punishment in Utah, but those provisions
had inadvertently been repealed in 1876 when the territorial legisla-
ture revised the penal code. Wilkerson contended the sentencing
judge was without authority to specify the mode of execution. The
Supreme Court rejected Wilkerson's argument and upheld the sen-
tence. It reasoned that because the penal statutes obligated the sen-
tencing judge to impose death in cases like Wilkerson's, the statutes
also conveyed implicit authority to specify the method of death.20
The Court noted an analogy to the common law tradition of sentenc-
ing to death without specifying the means of death.2' Although
hanging was the usual mode of execution at common law, other meth-
ods were sometimes used, and shooting was a common means of
executing those convicted of capital offenses under military law.2
Thus, the specification of shooting as the means of death neither ex-
ceeded the power of the sentencing judge nor imposed a totally un-
usual mode of execution.
The issue in Wilkerson was not whether shooting was cruel and
unusual punishment, but whether the sentencing court possessed
authority to prescribe a particular method of capital punishment.23The Court noted that Wilkerson did not challenge the constitutional-
16. "[Olf all our fundamental guarantees, the ban on 'cruel and unusual punishments! is one
of the most difficult to translate into judicially manageable terms." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 376 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
17. N. Ta E as, HAG BY THE NECK 7-12 (1967).
18. 99 U.S. 130 (1878). See L. BERKso,, supra note 12, at 22.
19. 99 U.S. at 131.
20. Id. at 137.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 134, 137.
23. This interpretation of Wilkerson was suggested by Justice Brennan in Furman v.
Georgia 408 U.S. 238, 284 n.30 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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ity of shooting.24 In dicta, however, the Court discussed shooting in
light of the eighth amendment and concluded that it was a constitu-
tionally acceptable mode of capital punishment because it was the
traditional method of carrying out executions under military law and
did not inflict torture or "unnecessary cruelty."25 The Court re-
ferred to the ancient practices of disembowelling while alive, drawing
and quartering, public dissecting, and burning alive as the kinds of
"terror, pain, or disgrace" proscribed by the eighth amendment. 26
Shooting, in the view of the Wilkerson Court, was not unconstitu-
tionally cruel because it was unlike historical execution by torture.
Definition of present cruelty by comparison with past practices that
were considered cruel and unusual at the time the Bill of Rights was
adopted-the so-called "historical interpretation" of the eighth amend-
ment27-was the primary mode of judicial analysis of the cruel and
unusual punishment clause well into the twentieth century.28
Twelve years after Wilkerson, in In re Kemmler,29 the Court
denied an application for a writ of error that sought reversal of a New
York state court decision upholding electrocution as consistent with
the state's constitutional proscription of cruel ind unusual punish-
ment. o The Court held that the eighth amendment did not apply to
the states and could not be made applicable through either the due
process or the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth
amendment."' Thus, the only federal constitutional issue was whether
the state had acted arbitrarily or applied the law unequally to violate
the fourteenth amendment. 2 The Court noted that the state's decision
to adopt electrocution occurred only after the New York legislature
had studied the recommendations of a commission appointed to in-
vestigate and report "the most humane and practical method" for
carrying out the death penalty.3 Hence, legislation enacting the
24. "Had the statute prescribed the mode of executing the sentence, it would have becn the
duty of the court to follow it, unless the punishment to be inflicted wis cruel and unusual, within
the meaning of the eighth amendment to the Constitution, which is not pretended by the counsel of
the prisoner." 99 U.S. at 136-37.
25. Id. at 136.
26. Id. at 135.
27. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 265 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
28. Id.; Granucci, supra note 12, at 842-43.
29. 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
30. Id. at 438, 443-44, 449.
31. Id. at 446-49. Kemmler was the first decision to hold that the eighth amendment was
not applicable to the states. Hence, its discussion of the eighth amendment is dictum. Goldberg
& Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HAitv. L. REv. 1773, 1784 nl I
(1970).
32. 136 U.S. at 448-49; Note, supra note 10, at 1329. The issues of arbitrary punishment
and cruel punishment are fundamentally distinct. Punishment is not arbitrary under the due
process clause if there exists a rational basis for what the legislature has done. For cruel and
unusual punishment, however, the concern is decency, not rationaliy, of the legislative action,
See Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1071, 1076 (1964).
33. 136 U.S. at 444-45.
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commission s recommendation of electrocution was not arbitrary,
especially because the lower court had considered evidence on the de-
gree of pain involved and had found electrocution "painless. 34
Even though the issue whether electrocution violated the eighth
amendment was not directly presented in Kemmler, the Court, did use
the occasion to discuss the cruel and unusual punishment clause. Af-
ter noting that crucifixion, breaking on the wheel, and other "mani-
festly cruel" punishments would be unconstitutional, 35 the Court in
significant dicta, further defined cruel and unusual methods of exe-
cution:
Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering
death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning
of that word as used in the Constitution. It implies there something
inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extin-
guishing of life.36
The cruelty of electrocution was obliquely called into ques-
tion in Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber.3' The issue in that case
was whether the State of Louisiana could constitutionally execute
the petitioner, Willie Francis, after the electric chair had accident-
ally malfunctioned during a previous execution attempt. Francis had
been prepared for execution, placed in the chair, and kept there for a
period of time after the switch was thrown. The victim, who experi-
enced considerable discomfort,38 was removed from the chair when it
became apparent that he would not die. A new death warrant was
issued.
Francis obtained a stay of execution and sought judicial approval
for his claim that any further attempt to execute him would be cruel
and unusual punishment contrary to the eighth amendment and a
violation of his fourteenth amendment due process rights. The Su-
preme Court denied relief. Although the Court was not willing speci-
fically to overrule Kemmler and hold that the eighth amendment
applied to the states,39 a plurality of four Justices took the position
34. Id. at 443. Considerable evidence at trial had, however, disputed the view that electro-
cution was necessarily quick and painless. L. BERGSON, supra note 12.
35. 136 U.S. at 446-47. The approach here is reminiscent of the 1i71kerson "historical
interpretation." See text accompanying note 27 supra.
36. 136 U.S. at 447 (emphasis added).
37. 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
38. Official witnesses of the aborted execution reported the events: "(T]he clectrocutioner
turned on the switch and when he did Willie Francis' lips puffed out and he groaned and jumped so
that the chair came off the floor. Apparently the switch was turned on twice and the condemned
man yelled: 'Take it off. Let me breath' [sic]." Id. at 480 n.2.
39. Eight members of the Court seemed, however, to assume the applicability of the eighth
amendment tc the states. Four Justices took the position in a plurality opinion that even if the
eighth amendment applied, it would not preclude a second attempt to execute Francis, but four
dissenting Justices strongly suggested that the second execution process would be precluded.
See 329 U.S. at 463-64, 475-77. Only Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in his concurring opinion,
specifically denied application of the eighth amendment to the states. Id. at 470. For the iew
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that subjecting Francis to the process of execution a second time
would not violate the eighth amendment. The cruel and unusual
punishment clause was interpreted by the plurality to prohibit only
the "wanton infliction of pain" or the "infliction of unnecessary
pain," not the suffering involved in "humane" executions." Because
the pain inflicted upon Francis was accidental and unintentional,
the state would not be precluded from making a second attempt to
execute him.
41
Four dissenting Justices would have issued a stay of execution and
remanded the case to the Louisiana Supreme Court to determine the
extent to which Francis had suffered pain in the bungled execution. 2
The dissent suggested that a second attempt to execute Francis
might constitute a violation of his due process rights under the four-
teenth amendment because it would constitute "torture culminating in
death," a repugnant practice long disclaimed in American law.4 3 The
dissent suggested that "[t]aking human life by unnecessarily cruel
means shocks the most fundamental instincts of civilized man" and
should not be permitted under the constitutional procedure of a self
governing people.44 Thus, the eight Justices who subscribed to the
plurality and dissenting opinions favored an analysis of eighth amend-
ment cruelty in terms of "unnecessary" suffering induced by the state.
Significantly, both the plurality and dissenting opinions cited with
approval the Kemmler dicta quoted above.43
The issue in Resweber was not whether electrocution per se was
compatible with the eighth amendment, but whether the aborted initial
execution attempt rendered subsequent attempts to take Francis' life
cruel and unusual. In Resweber the Court assumed that successful
electrocutions are not unconstitutionally cruel4 6 because they do not
inflict unnecessary cruelty or pain; the Resweber Court, however, did
not consider evidence of the actual pain suffered during death by elec-
trocution. In fact, the Court apparently has never reviewed evidence of
the actual pain inflicted by any method of execution.47
The Supreme Court has never specifically dec~ded whether hanging
that Resweber did not assume the applicability of the eighth amendment to actions by the states,
see Note, supra note 10, at 1334.
40. 329 U.S. at 463-64.
41. Willie Francis was executed one year and six days after th , first attempt. L. Bmtwsoq,
supra note 12, at 28.
42. 329 U.S. at 472 (Burton, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 473.
44. Id. at 473-74.
45. Id. at 463 n.4, 476.
46. Even the dissent in Resweber assumed that the typical execution by electrocution
involved instantaneous and painless death and thus would raise few constitutional problem,. See
id. at 474.
47. Note, supra note 10 at 1334.
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and gassing are cruel and unusual punishment.48  Thus, there are no-
Supreme Court decisions directly holding that any of the traditional
modes of execution are compatible with the eighth amendment.
B. Other Decisions-Flesh on the Bones of "Cruel and
Unusual Punishment"
Although Wilkerson, Kemmler, and Resweber are the Supreme
Court cases that most closely address the constitutionality of various
methods of execution, significant doctrinal developments relevant to
that issue have occurred in other eighth amendment cases. A consid-
eration of these cases will provide a fuller definition of the meaning of
cruel and unusual punishment.
A landmark in eighth amendment law is the Court's decision in
Weems v. United States.49 Weems broke with the earlier "historical
interpretation" of the cruel and unusual punishment clause and intro-
duced a more dynamic analysis that defines cruelty in terms of evolving
social mores. Under the Weems analysis the clause should "acquire
meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane jus-
tice."50  Interpretations of the clause should not be based solely on
"what has been," but should take into account "what may be."5' As
the Weems Court put it, "[t]ime works changes, brings into existence
new conditions and purposes.5 2
Weems is also significant because it reversed, on eighth amend-
ment grounds, a sentence of imprisonment and civil disability that was
unnecessarily harsh,53 as evidenced by the fact that it differed signifi-
cantly from sentences imposed by other jurisdictions for similar
crimes.5 4 Thus, Weems suggests that an important indication of the un-
constitutional cruelty of a given punishment or mode of punishment is
its failure to be employed elsewhere.
The relative concept of the eighth amendment that the Court had
articulated in Weems was developed further in Trop v. Dulles.55 Trop
struck down expatriation as cruel and unusual punishment for the crime
of military desertion. The Court found that "physical torture" was not
48. L. BERKSON, supra note 12, at 21, 31. The Supreme Court has indirectly given approval
to hanging and gassing by upholding sentences involving these methods. Id.
49. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). Weents reversed a Philippine Island court's judgment imposing a
sentence of fifteen years at hard labor, perpetual civil disabilities, and a fine, for the offense or
falsifying a public record. The Court held that the federal legislation prohibiting cruel and unusual
punishment in the Philippine Islands was to be interpreted identically with the eighth amendment.
Id. at 367. The sentence was reversed essentially because it A-as disproportionate to the crime
committed. Id. at 379-81.
50. Id. at 378.
51. id. at 373.
52. Id.
53. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
54. 217 U.S. at 380.
55. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
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a necessary element of unconstitutionally cruel punishment and that
the psychological pain inflicted on the expatriate, who would be sub-
jected to "a fate of ever-increasing fear and distress," was sufficient to
render the punishment unconstitutional.56 The Court perceived the
essence of the eighth amendment as "nothing less than the dignity of
man."5 7  Although the words of the amendment are difficult to define,
their meaning must be drawn "from the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society.""8 Constitutional provi-
sions "are not time-worn adages or hollow shibboleths," but are "vital,
living principles.
5 9
The plurality opinion in Trop60 gave content to the "evolving stan-
dards of decency" by examining, in the tradition of Weems, contem-
porary punishment practices of other jurisdictions. That expatriation
was no longer authorized elsewhere61 was taken as a significant indica-
tion that it had become an outdated anomaly.
62
The standards articulated by Trop, although technically accepted
by only a plurality of four Justices, have subsequently been embraced
by the full Court.63 In the 1972 landmark decision of Furman v.
Georgia,64 the Court held that the eighth amendment, now clearly
applicable to the states,65 prohibited the infliction of capital punishment
under virtually all state statutes because unrestrained discretion in im-
posing the penalty had resulted in its arbitrary infliction.66 All nine
Justices wrote separate opinions; seven Justices clearly embraced the
Trop standards of eighth amendment analysis. Two Justices found capi-
56. Id. at 101-02.
57. Id. at 100.
58. Id. at 101.
59. Id. at 103.
60. Justice Brennan concurred in the decision to forbid the sanction of expatriation on
different grounds from the plurality's eighth amendment rationale. Se 356 U.S. at 105 (Brennan,
J., concurring).
61. "The civilized nations of the world are in virtual unanimity that statelessness is not to
be imposed as punishment for crime." Id. at 102.
62. Id. at 102-03. When the eighth amendment was adopted in 1790, banishment, a form of
expatriation, was considered a reasonable and perfectly acceptable punishment for serious crime.
Imprisonment beyond brief pre-trial detention or punishment for minor offenses was totally
-unknown. As modern prisons evolved, however, banishment became increasingly suspect. See
Bedau, supra note 5, at 232.
63. Justices Douglas, Brennan, Marshall, Burger, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist all
cited the Trop standards as applicable in eighth amendment analysis in their various opinions in
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Justices Stewart and Stevens cited Trop with approval
in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) as did Justice White in his dissent in Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 351-52 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
64. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
65. In Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) the Court struck down a California
statute criminalizing drug addiction as violative of the eighth amendment, made applicable to
the states through the fourteenth amendment.
66. "[lhe capital punishment laws of 39 States and the Distrct of Columbia [are] struck
down [by Furman]." 408 U.S. at 411.
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67tal punishment unconstitutionally cruel per se, and the other three
concurring Justices considered its arbitrary application violative of the
eighth amendment. 68  Four Justices, dissenting, would not have inter-
fered with the impositibn of capital punishment.69
In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan further refined the idea
of "human dignity" that underlies the Trop concept of cruel and
unusual punishment. To Justice Brennan, "human dignity" as artic-
ulated in Trop entails respect for the "intrinsic worth" of persons."°
Punishments are proscribed by the eighth amendment when they are so
severe as to be "uncivilized and inhuman." Mental and physical pain,
however, is only one indication of inhumane punishment." Human
dignity is also affronted by punishments that are arbitrarily inflicted,
72
or unacceptable by contemporary standards. These standards are indi-
cated by historical trends away from the use of a particular punishment,
or a high level of contemporary public distaste for its employment.
73
Finally, Justice Brennan identified lack of necessity as a characteristic
of unconstitutionally cruel punishment:
The infliction of a severe punishment .by the State cannot comport
with human dignity when it is nothing more than the pointless inflic-
tion of suffering. If there is a significantly less severe punishment
adequate to achieve the purposes for which the punishment is inflic-
ted .. the punishment inflicted is unnecessary and therefore
excessive.74
Other members of the Furman Court also subscribed to this analy-
sis of unnecessary cruelty and compared present punishment with less
severe but equally effective alternatives. The four dissenting Justices
in Furman joined in the view that "no court would approve any method
of implementation of the death sentence found to involve unnecessary
cruelty in light of presently available alternatives. 'm  Although they
refused to find unconstitutional the institution of capital punishment
itself, the dissenters left the door open for later attacks on modes of
administering the death penalty under the "less cruel alternative"
analysis.76 In his concurring opinion, Justice Marshall also adopted
67. See 408 U.S. at 257 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 314 (Marshall, J., concurring).
68. See 408 U.S. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring); id at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring); id.
at 310 (White, J., concurring).
69. See 408 U.S. at 375 (Burger, CJ., dissenting); id. at 414 (Powell, J., dissenting; id.
at 405 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 465 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 270 (Brennan, J., concurring). "[Elven the vilest criminal remains a human being
possessed of common human dignity." Id. at 273.
71. Id. at 271-72.
72. Id. at 274.
73. Id. at 277-79.
74. Id. at 279.
75. Id. at 430 (Powell, J., dissenting).
76. The dissenters suggested that inquiry into the permissibility of any of the several
methods employed in carrying out the death sentence would call for a "discriminating evaluation
1978]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39:96
this approach.77 Lower courts, too, have applied an eighth amendment
"less cruel alternative" standard. 78
Furman reemphasized the relative nature of the cruel and unusual
punishment clause; the Court indicated that contemporary standards of
decency should be used for eighth amendment evaluation of punish-
ment.79  The dissent suggested, in the spirit of Weems and Trop, that
society's attitudes about morally acceptable and humane punishment
can be assessed objectively if state legislative actions are taken as the
reflector of public values. "[T]he first indicator of the public's attitude
must always be found in the legislative judgments of the people's chosen
representatives." 80 Legislative judgment was presumed by the Furman
dissent to embody the basic standards of decency prevailing in the
society.8' Because most states had death penalty statutes on their
books, the dissenters considered the death penalty to be consistent with
contemporary conceptions of humane punishment.
Analysis of decency in terms of legislative action or inaction was re-
emphasized in Gregg v. Georgia,82 this time by a majority of the Court.83
Gregg held for the first time that capital punishment did not necessarily
violate the eighth amendment.8 4  That many state legislatures had
enacted new capital punishment statutes in the wake of Furman indi-
of particular means." Id. "It is . . . within the historic process of constitutional adjudication to
challenge the imposition of the death penalty in some barbaric mantler .. " Id. at 420. "And
in making such a judgment in a case before it, a court may consider contemporary standards to
the extent they are relevant." Id.
77.
In order to assess whether or not death is an excessive or unnecessary penalty, it is
necessary to consider the reasons why a legislature might select it as punishment for one
or more offenses, and examine whether less severe penalties would satisfy the legiti-
mate legislative wants as well as capital punishment. If they would, then the death
penalty is unnecessary cruelty, and, therefore, unconstitutional.
Id. at 342 (Marshall, J., concurring).
78. In Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971), the court held that shackling
prisoners was too severe a sanction and violated the eighth amendment. The court applied the
less drastic means test in suggesting that it "simply cannot conceive that no less drastic means
can achieve that legitimate end [of keeping inmates from injuring theselves]." Id. at 648. The
court suggested that alternatives to shackling could be used. "[Eifforts to explore alternative
treatment methods have not been exhausted; indeed they have hardly been commenced. On
this showing the practice of fettering inmates in closed cells is both cruel and unncessarily so,"
Id. For a discussion of a variety of the "less cruel alternative" analysis see Singer, Sending Alen
to Prison: Constitutional Aspects of the Burden of Proof and the Doctrine of the Least Drastic
Alternative as Applied to Sentencing Determinations, 58 CORN4ELL L. REv. 51 (1972).
79. See 408 U.S. at 269-70 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 32) (Marshall, J., concurring);
id. at 382-83 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist joined in the
dissent.
80. Id. at 437 (Powell, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 384 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
82. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
83. Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens joined in a plurality in Gregg. Justice White,
joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and Blackmun, recognized legislative
action as an indicium of decency in his dissent in a companion case. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428
U.S. 325, 352-53 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
84. 428 U.S. at 176-87.
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cated to the Gregg Court that capital punishment was still a morally
appropriate and necessary sanction.85 The new statutes reflected legis-
lative judgment that the death penalty had not become intolerable
under contemporary moral standards. The legislative trend also indi-
cated that capital punishment may be useful to achieve the ends of the
criminal law.
86
Very recently, in Coker v. Georgia,87 the Court struck down a
Georgia statute imposing the death penalty for the crime of raping an
adult woman.8 The Court found the penalty disproportionate to the
crime and thus unduly harsh under the eighth amendment. The Court
reached its conclusion largely on the basis of legislative decisions of
other states. The fact that virtually all other states and most foreign
countries did not treat rape as a capital crime compelled the Court to
view capital punishment for rape as unnecessarily cruel.89
C. Further Clarification of the Concept of Human Dignity
The judicial development outlined above significantly clarifies the
notion of human dignity that is central to eighth amendment analysis.
Other considerations also contribute to a fuller understanding of the
application of the cruel and unusual punishment clause to techniques of
capital punishment.
Justice Brennan has noted that respect for the intrinsic worth of
persons is central to the concept of human dignity.90 A human being is
treated as a person when he is permitted to make choices that will
determine what will happen to him.9' Hence, the essence of being a
person lies in the notions of individual autonomy and freedom of choice.
92
"[I]f we respect their human dignity, we want people freely to be what
they can be and genuinely want to be. 93
Considerations of human dignity must be balanced against the
legitimate governmental interests that are furthered by a system of
85. Id. at 179-83; Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. at 351-54 (White, J., dissenting).
86. The highly controversial question whether capital punishment has a greater deterrent
effect than less severe punishments was perceived by the Court as an essentially legislative
judgment. Mass reenanctment of the death penalty indicated to the Court a legislative judgment
that capital punishment was necessary as a deterrent to crime. Id. at 185-87; Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. at 353-56 (White, J., dissenting).
87. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
88. Id. at 592.
89. Id. at 592-96.
90. See note 70 supra.
91. Morris, Persons and Punishment, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 572, 580 (J. Feinberg & H.
Gross eds. 1975).
92. "[Tlhe essence of being a person lies not in reason but in will ... ." Frankfurt, Free-
dom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, 68 J. PHILoso, Y 5, 11 (1971).
93. Stem, On Value and Human Dignity, 10 LtsTENiNO 74, 83 (1975). "Human dignity con-
sists in our recognising that each human being . . .has intrinsic value and is a valuer in his own
right." Id. at 83.
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punishment. All punishment necessarily restricts free choice; most
offenders would choose to avoid the sanction entirely. At the same
time, punishment in effect honors the choice of the criminal because it
completes the rational consequences of his act. To the extent that he
chooses to commit his criminal act, the law respects his personal choice
by punishing him; 94 yet an offender never forfeits his right to be treated
with dignity. If, as Justice Brennan says, "even the vilest criminal re-
mains a human being possessed of common human dignity,"9, it follows
that a criminal is entitled to have his choices honored and respected
unless they are inconsistent with the purposes and goals of punish-
ment. 96  Thus, punishment is offensive both to the offender's dignity
and to the Constitution if it unnecessarily defeats the offender's power
to act on choices he has made.
Gregg has established that the capital offender has no eighth
amendment right to live past the date set for his execution. Since,
however, the offender is entitled to all possible dignity before, and per-
haps after,97 his death, the offender's choices must be respected unless
they contradict the purposes of his punishment. His own decisions
about how his life is to be terminated should be honored unless it can
be shown that those decisions are inconsistent with legitimate state
interests.
Treatment as a person also includes recognition of the right to
privacy.98 The moment of one's death is a particularly personal and pri-
vate occasion. Dignity is offended if this most intimate experience is
involuntarily shared with those beyond the closest circle of family and
friends. Thus, techniques of capital punishment that unnecessarily
include witnesses to the convict's death may violate personal dignity
and raise eighth amendment issues.
Human dignity also entails respect for bodily integrity. The
eighth amendment cases express revulsion toward the ancient practice
of drawing and quartering.99 The courts have thus recognized that
unnecessary mutilation of the bodies of capital offenders affronts the
principles of human dignity that underlie the cruel and unusual punish-
ment clause. Because such desecration of the body is undignified and
94. See generally Morris, supra note 91.
95. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 273 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
96. The right to have one's choices respected is of course not absolute. "The recognition
[of others' autonomy] amounts . . . to our abstaining, as far a,-: circumstances allow, from
attempts at forcing them directly or indirectly to change their views, attitudes, or behavior."
Stern, supra note 93 (emphasis added).
97. The Wilkerson Court viewed the ancient practice of beh. ading an offender and then
disembowelling him and cutting him into four quarters as forbidden by the eighth amendment,
presumably as an affront to human dignity. See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135 (1878).
For a description of "drawing and quartering," see E. BOWEN-ROWLANDS, JUDoNItN Or
DEATH 105 (1924).
98. See Stillman, Prisons and Punishment, 5 J. Soc. PHILosoPHY It, 12 (1974).
99. See note 97 supra.
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indecent, 'w any form of capital punishment that unnecessarily dis-
figures the body of the victim is constitutionally suspect.
Human dignity is also disturbed by physical violence during
execution.' 0' Less violent forms of execution are more consistent with
the notion of human dignity than more violent forms.
Finally, forms of punishment that unnecessarily undermine the
self-respect of the person being executed deny him human dignity.1
0 2
The victim is entitled to be free from unnecessary humiliation.
D. Summary of the Definition of Cruel and
Unusual Punishment
As discussion of the cases demonstrates, punishments are violative
of the eighth amendment when they are "unnecessarily cruel." Wilk-
erson focuses specifically on "unnecessary punishment' ' 03 and Kemmler
speaks of "something more than the mere extinguishing of life"'" as
tests of undue cruelty. Unnecessarily harsh treatment no doubt repre-
sents the "something more" that the Kemmler Court contemplated.
Eight Justices adopted the unnecessary cruelty analysis in Resweber
although the plurality suggested that the presence of governmental
intent to cause unnecessary suffering is a special indication of eighth
amendment violation. Furthermore, Weems, Furman, Gregg,10 5 and
Coker'06 all include unnecessary cruelty as an aspect of the Court's
eighth amendment analysis.
The post- Weems cases all focus on the dynamic nature of the cruel
and unusual punishment clause. The evolution of social mores as well
as advances in technology and penology may contribute to invalidation
of punishments that were constitutionally permissible in the past. Leg-
islative trends away from a particular mode of punishment reliably indi-
cate both its cruelty and its lack of necessity. 0 7  Similarly, a punish-
ment may be viewed as unnecessarily cruel if jurisdictions that have
100. See Bedau, supra note 5, at 234.
101. See ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 1949-53 REPORT, CMD. No. 8932. at
255 (1949-1953) [hereinafter cited as ROYAL COMMssION ON CAPITAL PuNIShMiENT].
102. "The idea of human dignity is ... given content when it is explicated in terms of
the capacity for a sense of justice." Gerstein, Capital Punishent-"Cruel and Unusual"?:
A Retributivist Response, 85 ETHIcs 75, 78 (1974). "An affliction which undermines a man's self-
respect rather than awakening his conscience, which impairs his capacity for justice rather than
stimulating it, could not serve as just punishment." Id. Such undermining of self-respect would
therefore violate human dignity.
103. 99 U.S. at 136.
104. See 99 U.S. at 447.
105. The Coker Court asserts that Gregg stated the principle that "a punishment is
'excessive' and unconstitutional if it ...makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals
of punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain
and suffering." 433 U.S. at 592.
106. Coker cites favorably the "unnecessary suffering" standard of Gregg. Id.
107. See text accompanying notes 85 and 89 supra.
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never employed it are nevertheless able to operate well without it.108
Furman offers another criterion for necessity: whether less cruel but
equally effective alternatives to the punishment are available. If they
are, the punishment may be unconstitutional.
In sum, legislatures, as reflectors of social values, serve the func-
tion of defining the contours of decency and human dignity. Indecent
governmental infliction of mental or physical suffering constitutes
excessive cruelty. Punishment is considered an assault on human
dignity, and therefore cruel under the eighth amendment, when it
unduly restricts the offender's autonomy; unnecessarily invades his
privacy; or produces excessive mutilation of his body, undue violation
of his person, or unnecessary loss of self-respect.
III. AN EXECUTION PARADIGM AS A LESS CRUEL ALTERNATIVE
The foregoing summary of eighth amendment law strongly indi-
cates that constitutional review of modes of execution would benefit
from a comparison of present methods with known alternatives, not
now in common use, that may be less cruel. To highlight the unneces-
sary cruelty of present methods, there is posited a paradigm of less
cruel capital punishment that appears simultaneously to satisfy con-
stitutional requirements and to further legitimate penal policy.
A. The Suicide Option
To permit the condemned person the option of taking his own life
instead of being killed by agents of the state is a concession to human
dignity not practiced in modern times,'(9 but not unknown historically
nor without its contemporary advocates. ' '0 The example of Socrates,
108. The Court seems to have taken this approach in Trop. See 356 U.S. at 102-03,
109. For a list of methods used in executing criminals throughout the world, see Patrick.
The Status of Capital Punishment: A World Perspective, 56 J. CRlib. L.C. & P.S. 397, 398-404
(1965). Far from encouraging suicide, those states that employ capital punishment keep con-
victs on death row under constant observation so that they will not c mmit suicide, See Proposed
Repeal of the Death Penalty Under Federal Law: Hearings on S. 1760 Before the Suhconun. on
Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Comm. on the Judiciar; 90th Cong., 2d Sess, 21 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as 1968 Hearings] (statement of Clinton Duffy); Wootton, Moralit)' and Mls-
takes, in THE HANGING QUESTION 13 (L. Blom-Cooper ed. 1969). The case of Gary Gilmore is
illustrative. Gilmore attempted suicide only to be rushed to the hospital to preserve his life .o
that it might later be taken by the state. H. BEDAU, supra note 3, at 122. Cases of prisoners
slashing their throats seem fairly common. In one case a prisoner who had cut his throat with
a razor blade was granted a brief reprieve in order that his wound might heal sufficiently to in-
sure that his head would not be torn off when he was hanged. In another case, a prisoner slashed
his throat moments before he was to be taken into the gas chamber. He was quickly dragged
into the gas chamber, blood spraying from his neck, and executed. See Gottlieb, supra note 9,
at 8-9. The Royal Commission on Capital Punishment rejected thu, option of suicide because it
would not permit the "community's denunciation of the gravest of all crimes" and would be en-
couraging the offender to commit the sin of suicide. See Roy.AL COMMISSION ON CAPITAt
PUNISHMENT, supra note 101, at 266-67.
I10. See, e.g., Camus, supra note I; King, Some Reflections on Do-it-Yourself Capital
Punishment, 47 A.B.A.J. 668 (1961); Maddox, An Indecent Ritual, in Tim HANGING QOStlON
83 (L. Blom-Cooper ed. 1969).
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who refused the requests of his friends to postpone his death until the
last legally permitted moment, is particularly poignant. Socrates would
have considered it an affront to his self-respect to prolong life beyond
the moment it lost meaning. "I should only make myself ridiculous in
my own eyes if I clung to life and hugged it when it has no more to
offer.""' To have hemlock at his disposal infused the whole process of
his death with a modicum of dignity and personal respect.
Similar humanitarian considerations could be incorporated into
modem execution procedures. An execution date could be set; for a
brief, specified period after that date the condemned person would be
provided the means to take his life if he chose. He would be told the
lethal dosage of an oral sedative" 2 that would be placed at his disposal.
Death by drug overdose would be virtually painless'" 3 and without
many of the other human and economic costs t" 4 that attend traditional
modes of execution. If the condemned person failed to take his own
life before the period for optional suicide had expired, the state would
then execute him in the manner discussed below.
To permit capital offenders the right to suicide"t5 does not imply
that everyone has a moral right to take his own life." 6  Nor does it
imply that the offender has the right to demand that he be executed.,
7
Moreover, the existence of this limited right to suicide does not imply
11. PLATO, THE LAST DAYS OF SOCRATES 181 (H. Tredennick trans. 1954).
112. A variety of drugs could be provided. An overdose of barbiturates, perhaps nembutal
or seconal, would be a possibility. "[AlImost all compounds with definite hypnotic potency can
cause death if taken in sufficient quantities. . . ." DRUGS OF CIOICE 1974-1975. 238 (W. Modell
ed. 1974). See L. JONES, VETERINARY PHARMACOLOGY AND TnERAPEcTICS, 987-88 (3rd
ed. 1965).
113. See id.
114. "The ritual [of present executions] is unpleasant for the holy men who administer the last
rites and the medical men who must attend final heartbeats. And all the others-press observors.
official witnesses, death-watch crews, scaffold builders, head-shavers, wardens, gubernatorial
phone operators fare little better. King, supra note 110, at 669. Capital punishment brutalizes
those who must directly administer it." See E. BLOCK, AND MAY GOD HAVE MERCY 67-68
(1962); L. LAwEs, TWENTY THOUSAND YEARS IN SING SING, 306-07 (1932). Elliot, It is As-
sumed that I am in Favor of the Death Penalty, in VOICES AGAINST DEATH 205 (P. Mackey
ed. 1976). Some forms of execution carry a high monetary cost. It is estimated that it sould
cost S250,000 to build a gas chamber for the State of Oklahoma and S62,000 to repair an existing
electric chair. The Daily Oklahoman, Mar. 3, 1977, § 1, at 1, 2, col. I.
115. It is a "right" and not just a "privilege." To say that the convict has a "right" to die
by suicide is to say that the state has a "duty" to assist in making the suicide possible. See Cor-
bin, Legal Analysis and Terminology, 29 YALE L. J. 163, 167 (1919); Williams, The Concept
of Legal Liberty, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 1129, 1138 (1956). A "privilege" to commit suicide
would simply recognize that no penalty attaches if suicide is committed. Id.
116. A legal privilege to commit suicide now exists in most jurisdictions. Suicide is no-
where treated as a criminal offense; attempted suicide, although technically a crime in some
jurisdictions, is seldom prosecuted and its criminal proscription is highly disfavored by scholars.
See W. LA FAVE & A. ScoTr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 568-69 (1972). It is difficult to
argue on moral grounds that one has a duty, either to himself or to his society, to keep himself
alive once the state has decreed by its most solemn processes that he is unfit to live. See King.
supra note 110, at 669.
117. Suicide is the act of taking one's own life; punishment, by contrast, is infliction of
unpleasant consequences upon the offender by an authority outside himself. See Hart, Prole-
gomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in PUNISI"ENT AND REPONSIIHLlrY 1, 4-5 (1968).
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL[
that each capital offender has this right before his execution becomes
inevitable." 8 Rather, after all legal remedies have been exhausted and
execution is virtually inevitable," 9 the condemned person should be
allowed to pick the moment of his death. The time period allowed for
exercising the suicide option should be short, perhaps one or two days,
to reduce the trauma that attends the decision whether to commit sui-
cide, and to limit the possibility of a grant of clemency after the prisoner
had committed suicide but before the appointed hour of state execution.
The option of suicide appears to meet the criteria of constitutional
capital punishment.120  Physical and mental suffering would not exceed
constitutional bounds because death by drug overdose would be pain-
less, perhaps even somewhat pleasant,' 2 ' and the psychological appre-
hension that now attends the more violent contemporary methods of
execution122 would be removed. The dignity of the condemned would
be respected if the state allowed him to choose the circumstances of his
death. His privacy interests would be preserved if he were permitted to
pass quietly from life in his cell, without the violent, circus-like atmo-
sphere of traditional executions. 23  His right to bodily integrity would
be protected; no disfigurement or mutilation would occur. Finally, the
option of suicide would allow the condemned to retain a degree of self-
respect, in the manner of Socrates.
B. The Lethal Gas Mask
If the condemned person chose not to commit suicide the state
would take his life at the appointed hour. The interests of decency
would require, however, that the violence attending the execution pro-
cess be minimized. Perhaps the least violent method now available is
administration of certain forms of lethal gas. 24  For example, a con-
centration of pure and odorless carbon monoxide administered through
a mask would cause instantaneous and painless loss of consciousness
followed rapidly by death.125  Although a brief period of physical
For a discussion of the moral problems raised by the alleged "right to capital punishment" see
H. BEDAU, supra note 3, at 121-25.
118. Because there is always the possibility of judicial relief through the appellate
process or executive clemency, condemned offenders should be prevented from taking their lives
while on death row.
119. Execution is virtually certain when all judicial remedies hve been exhausted and the
date of execution has arrived without executive reprieve.
120. "[Olne would suppose that an innovative punishment would probably be constitutional
if no more cruel than that punishment which it superseded." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S 238,
331 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
121. See note 112 supra.
122. See text accompanying notes 189, 205 & 226 infra.
123. See text accompanying notes 184, 211 & 221-27 infra.
124. See ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 101, at 255.
125. Id. at 257. This method of inflicting death was suggested by the British Medical
Association as an alternative to hanging. Id. at 257. Other gases besides carbon monoxide
could be employed. See L. JONES, supra note 112, at 989-90. Gassing in the manner described
would be quicker and therefore preferable to execution by lethal injection. See text accbmpany-
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restraint might be required to secure the mask to the face of a struggling
prisoner, the force would be no greater than the force required to
administer the methods of execution now in use. 26  Use of a mask
instead of the customary gas chamber would avoid intensely negative
psychological associations with past practices, often brutal and
inhumane. Further, it is uncertain that death in American gas cham-
bers is painless. 27 Moreover, the gas mask could be used in surround-
ings familiar to the prisoner; he would not be required to endure the
additional anxiety of moving to a special death room.
Administration of the death penalty through lethal gas seems to
pose few constitutional problems. Physical pain would be virtually
eliminated and psychological suffering greatly lessened because the
prisoner would fear neither a painful death nor the terrifying last walk
to an unfamiliar death house. No bodily disfigurement would occur,
and physical violence would be minimal.
It is already apparent, and later discussion of the cruelty of tradi-
tional methods of execution will clearly establish, that the paradigm of
optional suicide or lethal gas is less cruel than the traditional modes.
The remaining issue, therefore, is whether the paradigm would achieve
the legitimate interests of capital punishment as effectively as present
execution methods.
C. The Paradigm and Capital Punishment Policy
A consideration of the relative merits of methods of inflicting
capital punishment must focus on two main policy considerations-gen-
eral deterrence and retribution. 128  To validate the paradigm as a less
cruel alternative to present modes of execution it must be shown that
the paradigm achieves the deterrent and retributive ends of capital
punishment as effectively as the customary methods of execution.
1. The Paradigm and Deterrence
One might argue that the humanitarian aspects of the paradigm,
particularly its suicide option, render it a less effective deterrent than
the more violent forms of execution now practiced.129 This argument
seemingly demands that executions be performed publicly and employ
the most painful technique. 30 Because such" torture could not satisfy
126. See text accompanying notes 184, 203, 220 & 237 infra.
127. See text accompanying notes 237-38 & 240 infra.
128. A variety of considerations underlie the imposition of the criminal sanction.. The
theoretical bases of punishment are generally thought to be incapacitation of dangerous offenders,
rehabilitation, special deterrence, general deterrence, and retribution. See W. LAFAvE & A.
ScoTr, supra note 116, at 21-25. The objective of incapacitating dangerous criminals is realized
no matter what method of execution is employed. The goals of rehabilitation and special
deterrence are irrelevant to an assessment of the value of various ways of killing offenders.
Economic considerations are sometimes relevant but will not be discussed here. It is assumed
that the paradigm would probably cost less to implement than any other method.
129. See ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 101, at 247-48 for the
view that hanging carries a special deterrent effect not possessed by more humane alternatives.
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constitutional requirements,13 1 the interests of deterrence must be
balanced against the interests of decency. Even if it were true that
more cruel execution methods deter more effectively than less crilel
methods, it by no means follows that the state is invariably justified in
inflicting the harsher punishment.
Fortunately, the issue need not hinge on a balance between the
state's interests in achieving deterrence and the demands of human dig-
nity. There is little reason to believe that the more cruel modes of
execution now used serve as better deterrents than the less cruel para-
digm. First, the public has very little knowledge of the cruelty of pres-
ent methods. 132  Executions are conducted in secret; the public learns
of them indirectly through various communications media.1" The
ordinary person, if he has thought about it at all, probably believes that
present modes of execution are decent, i.e., devoid of unnecessary
cruelty.
13 4
Apparently there have been no empirical studies that test the rela-
tive deterrent effects of various modes of execution, but the British
Royal Commission on Capital Punishment has considered the issue.
The Commission considered whether to continue execution by hanging,
historically "a peculiarly grim and degrading form of execution"'35 that
has retained its "stigma,"'136 and concluded:
We, . . .like most of our witnesses, are not convinced that a potential
murderer in this country is more likely to be deterred by the knowledge
that he may have to 'swing for' his victim than he would be by the knowl-
edge that he might have to suffer death in some other way. If there is a
difference, it must be so small that we do not think it ought to weigh with
us.
137
The Commission thus rejected the "more horrible the punishment the
131. See text accompanying notes 26 & 35 supra.
132. The secrecy of executions prevents contemporary society from reaching an informed
opinion of capital punishment. The very fact that executions are concealed indicates that they
are repugnant to present standards of decency. See A Cruel and Urnsual Punishment, in Voicts
AGAINST DEATH 264, 281-82 (P. Mackey ed. 1976). See also Blom-Cooper, Good Moral
Reasons, in THE HANGING QUESTION 121, 123 (L. Blom-Cooper ed. 1969):
The law, in decreeing that murderers can only be executed out of public sight, confesses
• .. that the spectacle of execution is injurious to those who see it. . . . [The hangers]
conceded some of the supposed deterrent effect of public execution because they could
not stomach the cold-blooded and ghoulish procedure of hanging a man by his neck.
133. A. KOESTLER, REFLECTIONS ON HANGING 165 (1957); M. MELTSNER, supra note 9, at
60-64. The public's knowledge of the realities of execution is remote, "[T]he people are pro-
tected by ...a semantic veil. The symbols but not the substance reach them," Gottlieb,
Capital Punishment, 15 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 1, 6 (1969).
DELINQUENCY 1, 6 (1969).
134. See Koestler, supra note 133, at 164-65.
135. ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 101, at 246.
136. Id. at 248.
137. Id.
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greater the deterrence" theory1 38  as irrelevant to the consideration
whether hanging should be retained.
To the extent that capital punishment deters, the deterrent effect is
probably produced by the threat of death itself rather than by the
method used to accomplish it. The fear of death is universal,
139
whether caused by disease, carbon monoxide, or the gallows. Thus,
adoption of the paradigm with its suicide option would not reduce the
deterrent effect.
Even if it is conceded that some deterrence would be lost through
substitution of the paradigm for traditional modes of execution, it is
likely that other deterrence would be gained by the substitution. The
death penalty actually serves as an incentive to some offenders who
commit capital crimes in order to be executed.140  There is reason to
believe that the form of the execution plays a significant role in foster-
ing this "suicide-murder syndrome."' 41  The thrill and notoriety sur-
rounding a violent mode of execution may well be the source of appeal
for such offenders.142  Adoption of the paradigm might reduce the inci-
dence of crimes committed as a result of the "suicide-murder syn-
drome." On balance, the paradigm should thus prove as effective a
deterrent as other forms of execution.
2. The Paradigm and Retribution
The term "retribution" is used in punishment theory to convey a
variety of meanings. In the context of administration of capital pun-
ishment, retribution can best be understood if its three separate mean-
ings are kept distinct. Retribution is sometimes equated with ven-
geance to refer to punishment inflicted in a wholly emotional manner. 43
It is also used to describe nonutilitarian theories of punishment based
138. Id.
139. "Death is ... a fearful, frightening happening, and the fear of death is a universal
fear even if we think we have mastered it on many levels." E. KuBLER-Ross, On DATH AND
DYING 5 (1969).
140. See Bedau, The Case Against the Death Penalty, in VoicEs AGAI2sT DEATu 301,
304 (P. Mackey ed. 1976); J. KERVOKIAN, MEDICAL RESEARCh AND THE DFATh PeVALTr 44
(1960).
141. Incitement of capital crimes by the existence of capital punishment is referred to as
the "suicide-murder syndrome" in Bedau, supra note 140, at 304.
142. There is reason to believe that Gary Gilmore committed his crimes in Utah so that he
might die in a "blaze of rifle fire" that would transform him into a kind of hero. See H. BEDAt,
supra note 117, at 121.
Many have noted that Gilmore, imprisoned in Oregon (where the death penalty has been
unconstitutional since 1964), took his parole release in Utah, the one place in the nation
where blood atonement, in the form of a firing squad, may be used to administer the
death penalty for murder.
Id. at 124. See also J. KVOKIN, supra note 140, at 46.
143. "Retaliation, vengeance, and retribution have been roundly condemned as intolerable
aspirations for a government in a free society." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 343 (1972)
(Marshall, J., concurring).
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on justice and desert. 144 In its third sense, the term retribution describes
punishment that serves a utilitarian purpose: to vent public disgust
toward criminals and, as a consequence, to increase respect for the law
and eliminate the likelihood that citizens will "take the law into their
own hands."
145
Whatever meaning is attached to retribution, the paradigm does
not become less desirable than other modes of capital punishment on
"retributive" grounds. It is an inappropriate application of the crimi-
nal sanction to impose a crueler sanction simply to inflict more suffer-
ing upon the offender. Retributive justifications for punishments that
are no more than emotional appeals to vengeance against the offender
are condemned almost universally.1 46  Hence, to favor hanging or
shooting over the paradigm simply because the former inflict more pain
or indignity is a purposeless and illegitimate invocation of the criminal
sanction.
Furthermore, retributive theories of desert will not justify the con-
clusion that a capital offender deserves hanging or shooting rather than
the form of capital punishment outlined by the p.radigm. Retributive
considerations require that the offender suffer according to his deserts as
determined by the seriousness of his crime. Principles of desert, how-
ever, set only rough boundaries of proportionality between offense and
punishment and do virtually nothing to establish the form that the
punishment should take.14 7  Even defenders of the lex talionis variety
144. See Gardner, The Renaissance of Retribution-An Examtnation of Doing Justice, 1976
Wisc. L. REv. 78!.
145.
The instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and channeling that instinct in
the administration of criminal justice serves an important purpose in promoting the sta-
bility of a society governed by law. When people begin to believe that organized society
is unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they "deserve,"
then there are sown the seeds of anarchy-of self-help, vigilante justice, and lynch law.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring i.
146. The concept of revenge is by definition an emotional and irrational reaction against a
perceived wrongdoer. See Gerstein, supra note 102, at 76. The St preme Court has repeatedly
emphasized that punishment must be rationally based, in the sense either that it is proportionate
to the crime or that it is not unnecessary. See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349
(1910). Hence, totally irrational punishment cannot be constitutional.
The Court has on occasion articulated some purposes that may legitimate the infliction of
punishment. Retribution has seldom been favored. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241,
248 (1949) ("Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law."); Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 345 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("Mihe Eighth Amendment is our
insulation from our baser selves. The 'cruel and unusual' language limits the avenues through
which vengeance can be channeled.").
Commentators generally agree. "[I]ndignation, however respectable an emotion in tile
individual, is a dangerous basis for public policy." Younger, The Historical Perspective, in TIlE
HANGING QUESTION 5, 5 (L. Blom-Cooper ed. 1969).
[V]engeance is the creed of the blood feud. The evolution of "civilized standards" which
replace primitive recourse to violence with institutions demanding reasoned resolution of
disputes marks the "progress of a maturing society." The mature society, then, is one
which denies itself the passion of retribution because civilization demands rationality.
Note, supra note 10, at 1350.
147. See generally Gardner, supra note 144.
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of retributivism seem unconcerned whether one method of executing an
individual murderer or class of murderers is more just than another. 48
In any event, an attempt to implement strict lex talionis doctrine would
unquestionably violate the eighth amendment.
1 49
The argument that the paradigm is unjustly lenient toward the
offender is unsupportable. Death is the ultimate sanction however it is
administered; the agony imposed on the condemned offender as he
counts down the remaining days of his life is profound.'50 The argu-
ment that he deserves additional suffering from the method of his execu-
tion is not persuasive. Considerations of justice do not preclude per-
mitting the condemned offender the option of taking his own life. The
state has actively moved against the offender by decreeing that he can-
not live beyond a given date; agents of the state would supply the
offender with the fatal drugs and instructions for their use. Hence,
though the offender would take an active part in causing his own death,
the state would remain the executioner because its power would coerce
the suicide decision. If justice demands that the offender give his life
for his crime, that demand is met whether the state is the sole agent of
death or simply an accomplice. The suicide option should not be re-
jected on principles of desert; to reject the option as "unjust" seems no
more than a hidden concession to revenge.
"Retribution" in its third sense, the necessary venting of public
steam, is also insufficient reason to reject the paradigm. Apart from the
fact that cathartic retribution is dubious justification for punishment, St
there seems little reason to believe that it is necessary to favor present
modes of execution over the paradigm in order to prevent people from
taking the law into their own hands. It can just as easily be argued that
148. Although Kant defended the principle that "the undeserved evil which any one commits
on another, is to be regarded as perpetrated on himself," Kant, Justice and Pumishment, in
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT 103, 104 (G. Ezorsky ed. 1972), he did not seem
to .believe that the actual form the murderer utilized in committing his offense is to be used in
executing the murderer. See note 7 supra. According to Kant, justice seems only to demand the
execution of the murderer in as dignified and humane a manner as possible.
149. See, e.g., Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135 (1878).
150.
We conventionally think of death as "the worst thing" that can happen to us. Know-
ing, as we all do, that we will die in some vague future does not impose any great stress.
The man in the grip of a relentlessly fatal disease has to cope with much more severe
stress. But mercifully, his death date is not fixed and he can alwa)s hope to see tomor-
row's sun rise. Presumably, the greatest of stresses would be imposed on the man who
knows he is going to be put to death-and knows just when that will be.
Bluestone & McGahee, Reaction to Extreme Stress: Impending Death by Evecution, 119 Ai. J.
PSYCHIATRY 393, 393 (1962); see Note, Mental Suffering Under Sentence of Death: A Cruel
and Unusual Punishment, 57 IowA L. REv. 814 (1972).
Albert Camus equated the death penalty with the most extreme form of punishment. It
induces more suffering in the condemned than he could ever have induced in his victim. It w'ould
be comparable for a criminal to warn his victim of the date, months hence, on w'hich a horrible
death would be inflicted upon him and to keep the victim confined from the time of warning. See
Camus, supra note 1, at 142.
151. See note 146 supra.
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executions through cruel methods encourage public brutality and dis-
respect for the law.1 2  In the past, lynchings seemed to occur more
often in states that employed the traditional modes of execution than in
jurisdictions that had abolished capital punishment. "3 Because a signi-
ficant proportion of the public favors abolition of capital punishment,
any execution could inspire public resentment of the legal system, parti-
cularly if the capital punishment were performed in an unnecessarily
cruel manner. 5 4  Finally, even if the public is particularly outraged by
a particular crime, its emotion almost always diminishes significantly
between arrest and execution; one would not expect execution accord-
ing to the paradigm to create public outcry for harsher punishment."'
The paradigm accomplishes the policy objectives of general deter-
rence and retribution at least as effectively as other modes of execution.
Therefore, if it can be shown to be less cruel than present methods of
inflicting death, the paradigm would seem constitutionally preferable as
the less drastic alternative. The cruelty of hanging, shooting, electro-
cution, gassing, and lethal injection will now be examined.
IV. THE PRESENT METHODS OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT:
A CONSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENT
The history of capital punishment throughout the ages reveals that
a wide variety of gruesome devices have been used to torture offenders
to death.156  Executions were often performed publicly in order to im-
press upon onlookers the consequences of violating the law.' Al-
though the grosser forms of inflicting death were not officially sanc-
tioned in the post-colonial United States, t58 executions were often
public and were not made exclusively private until well into the twen-
tieth century. 59 Removal of capital punishment from public view con-
stituted an admission that the common methods of execution, although
unlike the barbarities of past times, were nevertheless unseemly and
gruesome.
60
152. See Note, supra note 10, at 1299-1301. Taking human life by present execution
methods is basically demoralizing and repugnant to common human instincts, various devices
are employed to spare the sensitivities of executioners: the individual members of a firing squad
are not told whether their rifles contain live rounds or blanks; three persons simultaneously pull
switches but do not know which switch activates the electric chair. See E. BLOCK, supra note
114, at 67. Executioners, haunted by memories of executions, have committed suicide. At at 68.
153. L. LAWES, MAN'S JUDGMENT OF DEATH 53-55 (1924).
154. Note, supra note 10, at 1299-1300.
155. Id.
156. See J. LAURENCE, A HISTORY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 2-12 (1960).
157. G. ScoTT, THE HISTORY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 193 (1950),
158. In colonial times, however, gibbeting (suspending an already hanged body on a
frame) was not uncommon, and beheading, drawing and quartering, pressing to death, and burn-
ing were not unknown. N. TEETERS, supra note 17, at 87-110.
159. The last legal public hanging occurred in Kentucky in 1936. Id. at 6,
160. "We hide our executions because we are disgusted to look at them, because the view
[Vol. 39: 6
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Four main methods of capital punishment have been used in the
United States. Until the turn of the twentieth century, hanging was
virtually the exclusive method.' 6' Shooting was authorized in Utah and
briefly employed in Nevada but later abandoned. The advent of
electricity at the turn of the century started a distinct trend away from
hanging toward electrocution. Later, in the 1920's and 1930's, the
movement away from hanging continued, and several states aban-
doned the gallows in favor of the gas chamber. Some states that had
previously switched from hanging to electrocution also moved to the gas
chamber.162  In their post-Furman reenactments of capital punishment
Oklahoma and Texas selected lethal injection as the means of capital
punishment,1 63 but neither state has inflicted death by this method.
Electrocution is now the most popular execution method, 64 followed by
the gas chamber.165  Only seven states still permit hanging, and Utah
alone authorizes shooting.166  Oklahoma and Texas now employ lethal
injection.167
This brief review of historical developments provides a background
for examining the constitutionality of the common methods of execu-
tion. The discussion will place the various methods on a continuum
from most cruel to least cruel on the basis of the eighth amendment
analysis developed above.
68
A. Hanging
Although hanging as a means of executing criminals is an ancient
practice, 69 modern refinements have been made in an attempt to in-
of them would make men sick. We hide them because their public display would render them
unacceptable and flout the dignity of man." A Cruel and Unusual Punishment, supra note 132.
at 283.
161. See Bedau, General Introduction, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 21 (J. McCafferty ed.
1972); N. TEETERS, supra note 17, at 461.
162. See W. BOWERS, ExEcUTIoNs IN AMERICA 9 (1974).
163. See note 4 supra.
164. For the status of execution methods in the various states as of 1972. see Lsw
ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PCNISHStE'%T
1971-72, at 57-58 (National Prisoner Statistics Bulletin No. SD-NPS-CP-I, 1974) [hereinafter
cited as CAPITAL PUNIsHMENT 1971-72]. With the exception of Oklahoma and Texas no state
has changed its mode of execution since that time. See note 4 supra.
165. See note 182 infra.
166. As of 1972, Delaware, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota,
Rhode Island, Utah, and Washington permitted hanging. CAPITAL PUt.ISH %EN.T 1971-72,
supra note 164, at 57-59. North Dakota has subsequently abolished capital punishment, 1973
N.D. Sess. Laws, ch. 116, § 41, and Rhode Island has switched from hanging to the gas chamber.
1973 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 280, § 1. No other states have subsequently adopted hanging as the
mode of execution.
167. See note 4 supra.
168. The constitutional analysis corresponds to an intuitive ranking of methods according to
cruelty, hanging being most cruel, followed by shooting, electrocution, and gassing See J.
KERvOKIAN, supra note 140, at 15-16.
169. Hanging is traceable to biblical times. L. BERIso., supra note 12, at 21.
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flict death quickly and painlessly. Before the advent of the "long
drop" in the late nineteenth century,17 0 death by hanging was often a
slow and painful process of strangulation.'' When the victim is
dropped from a sufficient height his vertebrae are dislocated and his
spinal cord crushed; unconsciousness is immediate and death follows a
short time later. 7 2  If the drop is too long, however, decapitation
occurs. 73  Although hanging has become something of an art in modern
times1 4 and may well be painless when properly performed,'" evidence
of bungled hangings abounds: inadvertent decapitation'76 when victims
are dropped too long; strangulation 77 when they are dropped too short
to break their necks. 78  Strangulation may be the rule rather than the
exception. 79  Unconsciousness is supposedly instantaneous even when
the neck is not broken, °80 but it is not entirely certain that this is true. '
If the victim is conscious, death by strangulation must be extremely
painful.
82
Apart from the pain that may occur during strangulation and the
horror of occasional decapitations,' other indignities attend hanging.
170. See G. ScoTr, supra note 157, at 211; N. TEETERS, supra note 17, at 156-58.
171. N. TEETERS, supra note 17, at 156-57.
172. A. KOESTLER, supra note 133, at 139-40.
173. Id. at 140.
174. The proper ratio of the height of the drop to the weight of the victim's body was com-
puted and tabulated for use by British hangmen. See N. TEEERS, stpra note 17, at 157-58.
175. Id. at 154.
176. See id. at 186.
177. Id. at 176-78.
178. See G. ScoTT, supra note 157, at 214.
179. See id.; Duff;', in DEATH Row: AN AFFIRMATION OF LIFE 29 (S. Levine ed. 1972).
180. N. TEETERS, supra note 17, at 154.
181. A. KOESTLER, supra note 133, at 140.
182. This account of a bungled hanging and ultimate strangulation is related in N. TtLruts,
supra note 17, at 174:
The two weights, of 206 and 120 pounds, fell . . . and Jefferson's body was raised about
five feet in the air. It fell back limp when suddenly it began to writhe in agony. The
movements at first were not violent, but presently the legs, which had not been pinioned,
were drawn up toward the body, the knees reaching almost to the chin, white the arms
were extended pleadingly towards the occupants of the balconies right and left. The
man kicked furiously and moaned so piteously that a thrill of horror went through the
audience. The sheriff was bewildered. His face turned pale and his eyes filled with
tears. The hangman was called from his pen to witness his clumsy work. He looked
at his struggling victim, but said he could do nothing for him. .efferson freed his Hnds
sufficiently and clutched the noose, but, being unable to loosen the rope, he tore the black
cap from his face and stretched out his hand imploringly toward the audience. The
appearance of his face was terrible. After eight minutes of agony, which must have been
horrible, the contortions began to lessen, and finally ceased.
183.
The rope allowed a fall of more than seven feet, and one of the most sickening and re-
volting scenes in the history of Ohio executions followed. As the body dropped to a
standstill, a heavy gurgling sound was heard, and soon the blood in torrents commenced
pouring on the stone floor below. The black cap was raised slightly and it was found that
decapitation was almost complete, the head hanging to the body by a small piece of skin
at the back of the neck. During the half minute or more that the heart beat, the blood
was thrown against the platform above from the gash caused by the head being pulled
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Clinton Duffy, who participated in over sixty executions, offers the fol-
lowing description of hanging:
Hanging, whether the prisoner is dropped through a trap, after climbing a
traditional 13 steps, or whether he is jerked from the floor after having been
strapped, black-capped and noosed, is a very gruesome method of
execution. . .
The day before an execution the prisoner goes through a harrowing ex-
perience of being weighed, measured for length of drop to assure breaking
of the neck, the size of the neck, body measurements, et cetera. When the
trap springs he dangles at the end of the rope. There are times when the
neck has not been broken and the prisoner strangles to death. His eyes
pop almost out of his head, his tongue swells and protrudes from his
mouth, his neck may be broken, and the rope many times takes large por-
tions of skin and flesh from the side of the face that the noose is on. He
urinates, he defecates, and droppings fall to the floor while witnesses look
on, and at alfiaost all executions one or more faint or have to be helped out
of the witness room. The prisoner remains dangling from the end of the
rope for from 8 to 14 minutes before the doctor, who has climbed up a
small ladder and listens to his heart beat with a stethoscope, pronounces
him dead. A prison guard stands at the feet of the hanged person and
holds the body steady, because during the first few moments there is usu-
ally considerable struggling in an effort to breathe.
The legal witnesses are dismissed after having signed the usual witness
forms. However, the body of the condemned is left hanging below the gal-
lows for an additional 15 to 20 minutes. This is to assure those in charge
that ample time has elapsed before cutting the rope in order to make cer-
tain of death.
114
Sometimes, women who were hanged were paid the ironic considera-
tion of being provided rubber underwear to catch the droppings.185
Mutilation of the body is substantial; portions of the victim's face are
ripped apart. 8 6 The victim's neck elongates, distorts, and discolors187
The powerful jerk when the weight of the body reaches the end of the
rope makes hanging a particularly violent form of execution.188
back on the shoulder. The strong men who had charge of the execution turned to avoid
the scene, and stood fixed for a time, looking each other in the eye. Finally Coroner
Carrick, more thoughtful than the rest, though unable to speak above a whisper, called
for help to take the body down before it should disconnect from the head and fall. The
heavy clothing of the murderer had by this time become soaked and running with blood
from every wrinkle and seam. Those who lifted it up until the rope could be untied were
smeared with blood, and as the body was lowered to the pools of gore below, the gasping
trunk was exposed in all its horror.
Id. at 186.
184. 1968 Hearings, supra note 109, at 19-20 (statement of Clinton Duffy).
185. Koestler & Rolph, Hanged by the Neck, in Tie PE-NALTY IS DE,%Tit 229 (B. Jones ed.
1968).
186. See Duffy, supra note 179, at 29.
187. See ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 101, at 255; N.
TEETERs, supra note 17, at 180.
188. "[A]nticipation of the drop must be more dreadful than anticipation of the onset of the
electric current or the gas." ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISIIMENT, Supra note 101,
at 254.
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Hanging is cruel because of the possibility that it inflicts physical
pain. The fear of physical pain as well as other indignities attendant to
hanging generates psychological suffering and loss of self-respect in
the victim as he anticipates his fate.' 89 The physical violence of hang-
ing mutilates the body and offends the victim's right to bodily integ-
rity. Privacy is invaded when witnesses are permitted to attend the af-
fair' 90 and autonomy is denied because the offender is allowed no
choice of his fate.' 9' On the basis of the constitutional criteria for
cruelty developed above, hanging is cruel on all counts. It is signif-
icantly more cruel than the paradigm and thus unnecessarily harsh.
The unnecessary cruelty of hanging is further evidenced by the
legislative trend away from its use. Electrocution and the gas chamber
were initially developed to avoid the gross cruelties of hanging. 92 Less
than a century ago, hanging was authorized in every American state.'
93
Today, although forty states retain capital punishment,'94 only seven still
permit hanging. 95  Under the analysis developed in this article, hanging
is violative of the eighth amendment.
There is no Supreme Court decision directly upholding the consti-
tutionality of hanging. 196  Those state court cases that uphold hanging
as constitutional predate the application of the eighth amendment to the
189. The following description of a hanging illustrates its indecency:
The clumsy bailiff . . . proceeded to attire the pereformets [sic] for their final act.
On each of them he first placed a long white sleeveless robe which he tied around the
neck and ankles. Over their heads he drew a cone-shaped white cotton hood, and so
transformed what was a figure of pity into one of horrible offimsive comedy .... The
Majesty of the Law jested with these victims at the end, added indignity to death and sent
the poor devils as masked clowns to their doom.
Dunne, The Majesty of the Law, in VOICES AGAINST DEATH 156, 164 (P. Mackey ed. 1976),
190. See id.
191. Utah does provide capital offenders the choice of hangirg or the firing squad. UTAH
CODE ANN. § 77-36-16 (1953). The fact that offenders overwhelmingly choose the firing squad over
hanging is an indication of the harshness of hanging. See G. B tssiop, EXECUTIONS: Tile LrOAL
WAYS OF DEATH 34 (1965).
192. New York adopted electrocution after the governor had urged that a "less barbarous"
method of execution than hanging be found. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1890). Lethal
gas was introduced in Nevada to replace hanging and shooting in order to "provide a method of
inflicting the death penalty in the most humane manner known to modern science," State v. Gee
Jon, 46 Nev. 418, 437, 211 P. 676, 682 (1923). "Since the development of the supposedly more
humane methods of electrocution late in the 19th century and lethal gas in the 20th ... hanging
and shooting have virtually ceased." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 296-97 (1972) (Brennan,
J., concurring). The court in State v. Jones, 200 La. 808, 823, 9 So. 2d 42, 46 (1942) found "the
infliction of death by electrocution is more humane and less painful Than by hanging . . ."
193. See W. BOWERS, supra note 162, at 6-10. Maine abolished capital punishment entirely
in 1887; other states followed in the twentieth century. Id.
194. The constitutionality of some state statutes may be questionable in light of Furman and
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). The only states that do not have some form of
capital punishment on their books are Maine, Michigan, North Dakota, Wisconsin, Minnesota,
Iowa, West Virginia, Oregon, Alaska, and Hawaii. In CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1971-72, supra
note 164, at 57-59, New Jersey was mistakenly reported as having abolished capital punishment.
See LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. I)EPT. OF JUSTICE, CAI'ITAL
PUNIS HMENT 1975, at 5 n.6 (National Prisoner Statistics Bulletin No. SD-NPS-CP-4, 1976)
[hereinafter cited as CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1975].
195. See note 166 supra.
196. L. BERKSON, supra note 12, at 21.
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states197 and are ripe for reexamination in light of the doctrinal develop-
ment of the cruel and unusual punishment clause that is outlined
above. 98
B. Shooting
Because the firing squad is rarely employed as a method of capital
punishment, there is little information about its use.' 99 The small
amount of information that is available, however, suggests the firing
squad is also unconstitutional.
Firing squads in Utah, the only state to execute by shooting,200 are
composed of five citizen volunteers selected secretly by a presiding
officer.20 ' Four of the five are given weapons with live rounds; the rifle
of the fifth contains a blank.20 2  The victim is strapped in a chair less
than ten feet from the firing squad.20 3 A hood is fitted over his head
and a small target placed over his heart.2° Upon the signal to fire, four
bullets are supposed to enter his heart and kill him instantly.
It is not certain whether death by firing squad causes physical
pain.20 5 It is probable, however, that if the marksmen miss their target,
197. See, e.g., State v. Burris, 194 Iowa 628, 639, 190 N.W. 38, 43 (1922); State v.
Butchek, 121 Ore. 141, 153, 253 P. 367, 370 (1927). "The earliest Supreme Court authority for
the proposition that the eighth amendment applies to the states dates from 1962. The Court has
never assessed modes of capital punishment in terms of that proposition." Note, supra note 10,
at 1327 (footnote omitted).
198. Since the time when most death penalty provisions were enacted relevant constitutional
doctrine has changed radically. Most capital punishment statutes were passed long before Trop.
Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note 31, at 1814. Virtually none of the post-Furman reenactments
changed the method of execution. See note 4 supra. Since the time of the original enactment
of capital punishment statutes, standards of decency seem to have changed as they relate to
hanging.
The fact that a minority of nine states permits hanging does not bar a finding that hanging
is unconstitutional. At the time Robinson v. California struck down criminal punishment for
drug addiction as violative of the eighth amendment, nine other states besides California had
similar laws. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 174 n.19.
199. There is little serious scientific substantiation of the claims advanced for electrocution or
gassing. According to a 1953 Gallup Poll, however, the American public strongly favored elec-
trocution over gassing and hanging, and shooting had very few supporters. Bedau, supra note
161, at 23.
200. The military retains shooting as a mode of execution but it is very rarely employed. It
is generally imposed only for desertion, mutiny, or other purely military offenses. W. WITniOP,
MiLrrARY LAW AND PRCCEDENms 418 (2d ed. 1920). Military executions for crimes not purely
military in nature are carried out by hanging. Id. During 1930-67 the Army and the Air Force
carried out 160 executions, 159 of which were for ordinary crimes and only one for a purely mili-
tary offense. CAPrrAL PUNISHMENr 1975, supra note 194, at 4 n.5. In any event, it is arguably
appropriate to permit military executions by firing squad, particularly for mutiny or desertion on the
front lines. Under military conditions shooting might be the only practicable means to effectuate
capital punishment, but this rationale clearly does not apply to states that impose the death
penalty.
201. G. BISHOP, supra note 191, at 34.
202. Id.
203. 1968 Hearings, supra note 109, at 79 (statement of Phillip Hansen).
204. Id. For an account of the execution of Gary Gilmore, see N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1977,
§ 1, at 1, col 4.
205. "[W]hen the heart is ripped out by bullets, who can say what passes through the victim's
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pain will occur. In the 1951 execution of Eliseo Mares, for example,
all four of the bullets of a Utah firing squad entered the wrong side of
the victim's chest, and the condemned man bled to death.0 6 It appears
the misses were intentional; whether the riflemen wished to torture the
victim or feared to inflict the fatal shot in the heart is unknown. In
another reported incident the victim was shot in the shoulder and
screamed in pain for twenty minutes until more ammunition could be
obtained. He was finally shot in the head.20 7 Victims have been shot
in other parts of the body, sometimes as far from the ideal target as the
ankle.208
The Royal Commission on Capital Punishment did not even con-
sider the firing squad as a serious alternative to hanging: "The firing
squad is open to obvious objections as a standard method of civil execu-
tion: it needs a multiplicity of executioners and does not possess even
the first requisite of an efficient method, the certainty of causing imme-
diate death., 20 9 The possibility of severe pain and prisoners' apprehen-
sion of painful death bespeak the cruelty of shooting.
The involvment of ordinary citizens in the execution process
allows the firing squad to be a vehicle of public vengeance, stripping the
execution process of whatever dignity it might otherwise have." 1
Many citizens volunteered for the firing squad in the recent execution of
Gary Gilmore,2st and the Mares incident reveals that the firing squad
is potentially a source of torture at the hands of citizens seeking
revenge. The Resweber Court pointed out, however, that an execution
process motivated by an intent unnecessarily to harm the victim may be
unconstitutional.2 2 Hence, for a state to use the firing squad is unwise
and probably unconstitutional.
Death by firing squad significantly mutilates the body of the
offender, an affront to his dignity.2 3  The multiplicity of executioners
mind? What appears to us as a pleasant death, because apparently instantaneous, may be ex-
tremely torturous." J. KERVOKIAN, supra note 140, at 19.
206. G. BISHOP, supra note 191, at 34-35.
207. 1968 Hearings, supra note 109, at 21 (statement of Clinton Duffy).
208. Id. at 79 (statement of Phillip Hansen).
209. ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 101, at 249.
210. The Royal Commission on Capital Punishment noted its disapproval of methods of
execution that perpetuate vengeance. "Tjhe ambition that prompts an average of 5 applications
a week for the post of hangman ... reveal[s] psychological qualities of a sort that no state would
wish to foster in its citizens." Id. at 256 (footnote omitted). Another commentator has said:
[T]he desire for vengeance has deep, unconscious roots and is roused when we feel strong
indignation or revulsion. . . . [Sluch impulses should [not] be legally sanctioned by
society, any more than we sanction some other unpalatable instincts of our biological
inheritance. Deep inside every civilized being there lurks a tiny S:one Age man. dangling
a club to rob and rape, and screaming an eye for an eye. But we, would rather not have
that little furclad figure dictate the law of the land.
A. KOESTLER, supra note 133, at 100.
211. See N.Y. Times, Nov. I1, 1976, § 1, at 14, col. 1.
212. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
213. See 1968 Hearings, supra note 109, at 20 (statement of Clinton Duffy),
[Vol. 39:96
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denies the condemned person his right of privacy. Shooting with high-
powered rifles at ten feet produces gross physical violence that indi-
cates disrepect for the victim as a person.
Legislative rejection of shooting serves to confirm that it is cruel.
Nevada, the only state other than Utah ever to permit the firing squad,
replaced shooting with lethal gas in an attempt to "provide a method of
inflicting the death penalty in the most humane manner known to modern
science. '1 4 The cruelty of the firing squad is unnecessary in light of
less cruel alternatives such as the paradigm. Moreover, every jurisdic-
tion in the nation except one operates without it.
21 1
C. Electrocution
Although the electric chair was introduced initially as a more
humane alternative to hanging or shooting, it is questionable whether
electrocution represents any humanitarian advance. Most authorities
agree that death by electrocution is painless,1 6 although some strongly
disagree.2z 7 Even if most electrocutions are painless, Resweber illu-
This is a shooting. They strap him in there. They find his heart. They put the patch.
... Whey shoot with these high-powered rifles. They have had to reload on occasion.
.. .Then while he is twitching like the chicken with his nerves and the head cut off, the
doctor goes in with his stethoscope again in approximately 2 minutes or in excess
thereof. He finally says, "dead." . . . They take him out between the fences right out
in the yard and shoot him and these bullets go through him ... and ricochet off like
in the cowboy movies. This is what we have going on in the State of Utah. I am sure
other types of killing are just as cruel, are just as barbaric ...
Id. at 79 (statement of Phillip Hansen).
Shooting is so inhumane that it is not even considered a dignified way to perform euthanasia
on animals. "Few laymen countenance shooting in euthanasia of pets. . . . Pets generally are
destroyed by electrocution or by the administration of a lethal dose of a drug." L JONEs, supra
note 112, at 893.
214. See State v. Gee Jon, 46 Nev. 418,437,211 P. 676, 682 (1923). The Oklahoma Legisla-
ture recently ranked shooting below both intravenous injection and electrocution as an acceptable
mode of execution. See 1977 Okla. Sess. Laws, ch. 41, § 1. Such a ranking is based on humani-
tarian and not economic considerations. See Tulsa Daily World, Mar. 3, 1977. Employing the
electric chair is considerably more expensive than shooting.
215. The Wilkerson dictum with respect to execution by firing squad carries little authority,
given the Court's post-Weents analysis of cruelty in terms of evolving social mores. Although
shooting convicts may have been consistent with concepts of decency at the time Iilkerson was
decided, there is little reason to believe the same view prevails today. Hence, under the analysis
presented in this article, the firing squad is an unconstitutionally cruel punishment.
216. See ROYAL CoMMIssIoN ON CAPrrAL PUNtLsu'MENT, supra note 124, at 251; M.
DISALLE, THE POWER OF LirE OR DEATH 20 (1965) (pathologists differ on just how electrocution
kills; some say the heart muscle is paralyzed, but most believe death is caused by paralysis of
the respiratory center); J. LAURENCE supra note 156, at 68. There is scant scientific substantia-
tion of the claims advanced for electrocution. See Bedau, supra note 161, at 22-23.
217. A distinguished French scientist, L.G.V. Rota, characterized execution through elec-
trocution as a form of "torture" because the victim may be alive for several minutes after the
current has passed through the body. He also contended that certain persons have greater
physical resistance to electric current than others. N. TEETERS, supra note 17, at 447. Another
early expert said:
The current flows along a restricted path into the body, and destroys all the tissue con-
fronted in this path. In the meantime the vital organs may be preserved; and pain, too
great for us to imagine, is induced. The brain has four parts. The current may touch
only one of these parts; so that the individual retains consciousness and a keen sense of
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strates that agonizing torture caused by malfunctions in the electric
chair is always possible. Often two or three jolts are required before
the victim is pronounced-dead.2 t8
Apart from the issue of physical pain, electrocution, like hanging,
requires preliminaries that sharpen the prisoner's apprehension of his
fate and increase his psychological suffering.21 9 Early in the morning of
execution day, the top of the condemned person's head and the calf of
one leg are shaved to afford direct contact with electrodes. The pris-
oner then waits, sometimes for hours, until he is taken to the execution
chambers, strapped into the chair, and connected to electrodes at his
head and legs.220
Various indignities attend electrocutions. Sometimes the vic-
tim's eyeballs fall from their sockets. 22' He urinates and defecates, and
his tongue swells. 222 The body may catch on fire,223 and the smell of burn-
ing flesh usually permeates the chamber.224 Electrocution is an ex-
tremely violent means of inflicting death. At the moment the switch is
thrown all the muscles of the body contract; the result is severe contor-
tions of the limbs, fingers, toes, and face.225 The body turns bright red
as its temperature rises.226 Witnesses to electrocutions often become
emotionally upset by the gruesome aspects of this method of death. 2 7
Electrocution is cruel because it may inflict pain. It causes undue
psychological suffering and offends human dignity because it is violent
and disfigures the body. None of this cruelty is necessary since less
cruel alternatives are available.
There is evidence of a legislative trend away from electrocution.
Two states, acting on humanitarian grounds, recently abandoned elec-
221trocution in favor of the more humane method of lethal injection.
agony. For the sufferer, time stands still; and this excruciating torture seems to last for
an eternity.
Id., quoting N.Y. World, Nov. 17, 1929.
218. Id. at 449.
219. One requirement of "humanity" in executions is to keep !he preliminaries to the act of
execution as simple as possible. ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 101,
at 253.
220. Id. at 251.
221. See 1968 Hearings, supra note 109, at 20 (statement of Clinton Duffy); Rubin, Thc
Supreme Court, Cruel and Unusual Punishment, and the Death Penalty, 15 CRIME & DILIN-
QUENCY 121, 129 (1969).
222. 1968 Hearings, supra note 109, at 20 (statement of Clinton Duffv).
223. Rubin, supra note 221, at 128.
224. Id.; "[The smell of frying human flesh is sometimes bad enough to nauseate even
the press representatives who are present." As quoted in N. TEErERS, supra note 17, at 449.
See also 1968 Hearings, supra note 109, at 20.
225. See C. DUFF, A NEW HANDBOOK ON HANGING 118 (1954).
226. G. BISHOP, supra note 191, at 27.
227. See note 224 supra; Rubin, supra note 221, at 129.
228. Before adopting lethal injection, both Oklahoma and Texas employed the electric
chair. See CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1971-72, supra note 164, at 58. See also note 3 supra.
Sponsors of the lethal injection legislation in Oklahoma were motivated by a desire to eliminate
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Earlier, three states had rejected the electric chair in favor of the gas
chamber.229  Although five states have moved from electrocution to
more humane methods of execution, no state has moved from gassing or
lethal injection to electrocution. 210 This legislative activity evidences
the unnecessary cruelty and thus the probable unconstitutionality of
the electric chair.
Supreme Court dicta in Kemmler and Resweber should not pre-
clude judicial scrutiny of execution by the electric chair.231  State cases
that hold electrocution consistent with state constitutional provisions
against cruel punishment 232 should be reexamined in light of subsequent
eighth amendment doctrine.
D. The Gas Chamber
Lethal gas was introduced in response to the cruelties of hanging,
233 . 234shooting, and electrocution. Although the gas chamber has cer-
tain advantages over these other methods because it is less violent 3.
and does not mutilate or disfigure the body, 236 it is questionable whether
death by lethal gas is painless:
[The prisoner] is accompanied the 10 or 12 steps by two officers, quickly
strapped in the metal chair, the stethoscope applied, and the door sealed.
The warden gives the executioner the signal and, out of sight of the wit-
the cruelty and inhumanity of electrocution in favor of a more humane form of execution. See
Tulsa Daily World, Mar. 3, 1977; The Oklahoma Journal, May 10, 1977. § I. at 1. 2.
Representative Ben Grant, one of the sponsors of the Texas bill to introduce lethal injection.
argued in the Texas Legislature that death by electrocution is a "gruesome ritual." and the electric
chair is "a barbaric torture device." Letter from Representative Ben Z. Grant to Martin R.
Gardner (August 8, 1977) (on file in University of Nebraska College of Law Library).
229. W. BOWERS, supra note 162, at 9. The change from electrocution to gas was no doubt
primarily motivated by humanitarian and not economic considerations. Gas chambers are expen-
sive to build and maintain. The cost to build a gas chamber in Oklahoma was recently estimated
at S250,000. The Daily Oklahoman, Mar. 3, 1977, § 1, at 1, 2, col. 1.
230. See W. BowERs, supra note 162, at 200-402.
231. "[I]f the Supreme Court hears evidence on the realities of capital punishment in terms
of physical pain and mental torture, it cannot adhere to the premises upon which it has assumed
the death penalty consistent with the eighth amendment." Note, supra note 10, at 1338 (footnote
omitted). See note 197 supra.
232. See, e.g., Ferguson v. State, 90 Fla. 105, 105 So. 840 (1925); Hart v. Commonwealth,
131 Va. 726, 743, 109 S.E. 582, 587 (1921); State v. Burdette, 135 W. Va. 312, 339.40. 63 S.E.2d
69, 85 (1951).
233. See State v. Gee Jon, 46 Nev. 418, 437, 211 P. 676, 682 (1923).
234. The Nevada Legislature considered and rejected shooting, hanging, and electrocution
in favor of the gas -chamber. See id.; G. Bisuop, supra note 191, at 162. "li]t is generally
believed, if not demonstrable, that asphyxiation is less brutal than electrocution and far less than
hanging." N. TmERs, supra note 17, at 451.
235. See ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNIsHMEN',r supra note 101, at 255.
236. The absence of mutilation is a significant humanitarian consideration. In executions
by lethal gas
the family of the condemned prisoner, his loved ones and the friends % ho claim the body
do not go through as much of a harrowing experience when they claim a body that has
not been mutilated. I have talked with many of these folks and, although they are grief-
stricken, it is not quite so hard on them emotionally, when the body is not disfigured.
1968 Hearings, supra note 109, at 21 (statement of Clinton Duffy).
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nesses, the executioner presses the lever that allows the cyanide gas eggs
to mix with the distilled water and sulphuric acid. In a matter of seconds the
prisoner is unconscious. At first there is extreme evidence of horror, pain,
strangling. The eyes pop, they turn purple, they drool. It is a horrible
sight. Witnesses faint. It finally is as though he has gone to sleep.
2
"
7
Other accounts describe the prisoner struggling, apparently consciously,
for a matter of minutes before becoming unconscious. 2 ' The apparent
suffering is sometimes said to be unconscious reflex2 39 but no one
knows for certain whether the victim of gaseous asphyxiation suffers
pain.24 °
When the eighth amendment criteria of cruelty are applied it is
open to question whether the gas chamber can pass constitutional
scrutiny. Because the gas chamber avoids some of the violence and
indignity inherent in hanging, shooting, and electrocution, it is unclear
whether the paradigm alternative is significantly less cruel. More-
over there has not been a demonstrable legislative trend away from
gas.
2 4 1
Case law that upholds gassing is outdated in light of subsequent
eighth amendment development 2  No Supreme Court decisions
directly uphold the gas chamber.243 Given the possibility that gassing
inflicts pain and the availability of demonstrably less painful alter-
natives, the constitutionality of the gas chamber is questionable.
E. Lethal Injection
Legislative movement away from the traditional modes of execu-
tion was signalled by the recent adoption of lethal injection in Oklahoma
and Texas244 and the consideration of this new method by several other
states.245 Intravenous injection of sufficient quantities of an ultra fast-
acting barbiturate combined with a paralytic agent246 causes uncon-
237. Id.
238. See, e.g., the account quoted in Rubin, supra note 221, at 129.
239. M. DISALLE, supra note 216, at 23.
240. Cyanide causes convulsions and kills by cutting off the supply of oxygen to the cells.
This amounts to suffocation, probably an unpleasant way to die. See J. KERVOKIAN, supra
note 140, at 17-18.
241. The State of Oklahoma has recently adopted lethal injection after it had considered the
gas chamber. The choice was motivated, however, primarily by economic and not humanitarian
considerations. See The Oklahoma Journal, Mar. 3, 1977, § I, at 2, col. 1.
242. See, e.g., People v. Daugherty, 40 Cal. 2d 876, 894, 256 P. 2d 911, 922, cert. dented,
346 U.S. 827 (1953); State v. Gee Jon, 46 Nev. 418, 211 P. 676 (1923) note 219 supra.
243. See L. BERKSON, supra note 12, at 31.
244. See note 4 supra.
245. See The Oklahoma Journal, Mar. 11, 1977, § 1, at II, col. 7.
246. The Oklahoma statute specifies "continuous, intravenous administration of a lethal
quantity of an ultrashort-acting barbiturate in combination with a chemical paralytic agent" as
the method of execution. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 1014(a) (We~t Supp. 1977). The Texas
statute specifies only "intravenous injection of a substance or substances in a lethal quantity."
The Director of the Department of Corrections is empowered to determine the injection proce.
dures. TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 43.14 (Vernon 1978).
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sciousness within forty seconds and death shortly thereafter.247 Apart
from the initial pain of inserting the needle, the process is painless if
properly done. 248 Because the injection must be intravenous and not sim-
ply intramuscular, 249 however, some practical problems might arise in
administering lethal injections. If the victim struggled or his veins were
difficult to locate250 the injection might inadvertently be administered
intramuscularly, which would cause the victim pain.25' These problems
could be minimized by administering a nonlethal sedative, either oral or
intramuscular, prior to beginning the process of lethal injection.52
Thus, the process of execution would extend over a longer period of time
than it now does and for this reason would be less desirable than the
mode outlined in the paradigm; but the victim would feel only the pain
of the sedative injection and not even that if he consented to oral
sedation. There would be minimal violence, no mutilation, and little
more indignity than attends an ordinary surgical operation.
Because of the novelty of lethal injection as a means of inflicting
capital punishment there are no cases dealing with its constitutionality.
It would appear, however, to comport with the requirements of the Con-
stitution unless failure to provide the suicide option is found to be a
significant infringement of autonomy and dignity. Lethal injection, like
the firing squad, is vulnerable to abuse by malevolent executioners.
These points might be argued if the new lethal injection statutes are
subjected to constitutional challenge.
Hanging, shooting, and electrocution are unconstitutional under
the stringent eighth amendment analysis described in this article. The
gas chamber, although less cruel in many ways, is not beyond constitu-
tional question. Even lethal injection, clearly the most humane of the
present methods, might be unconstitutional when compared to less cruel
alternatives like the paradigm. The time is ripe for constitutional
scrutiny of all these methods.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper has not argued that "humane" ways of inflicting death
could or should be devised. The inherent indignities of death deliber-
ately imposed upon a person by his fellows may well make the death
247. See ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT supra note 101, at 257; Letter
from Dr. Stanley Deutsch, Head of Department of Anesthesiology, The University of Oklahoma
Health Sciences Center, to Senator Bill Dawson, Oklahoma State Senate (February 28, 1977)
(on file in University of Nebraska College of Law Library) [hereinafter cited Deutsch Letterl.
248. See ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 101, at 257; Deutsch
Letter, supra note 247.
249. See ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 101, at 257-58.
250. See id. at 258.
251. Id. at 260.
252. See Deutsch Letter, supra note 248.
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penalty untenable from a truly humanitarian perspective.2" Given
capital punishment as a present reality, however, human decency as
embodied in the eighth amendment and defined by the courts demands
at least that execution be imposed more humanely than it has been in
the past. The movement away from ruthless punishment has been a
gradual process. 254  The incremental humanitarian gains achieved by
rejection of more cruel methods of execution in favor of less cruel
methods may be significant in the progression from a barbarous society
to one that espouses principles of dignity and humanity. Honest and
open scrutiny of the ways we inflict death may serve eventually to raise
the collective moral conscience to the point that the public will oppose
any infliction of death as a punishment. Until then, rejection of pres-
ent cruelties would at least "provide a little deceny where today there
is nothing but a sordid and obscene exhibition. 255
253. See generally Ramsey, The Indignity of 'Death with Digniiy, 2 HASTINOS CLNTIfR
STUDIES 47 (1974).
254.
The history of criminal law is in large part a history of abolitions Cruel procedures, like
torture, once thought indispensible, and punishments no less crtel, such as amputation,
have been progressively abolished, not only because they wcrn repugnant to a more
enlightened moral conscience but also because their utter uselessness had been learned
by experience.
Del Vecchio, The Struggle Against Crime, in THE PILOSOPHY oF PVNIS1SIENT 197, 199 (-1.
Acton ed. 1969).
255. Camus, supra note 1, at 131, 153.
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